tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7621529782651296685.post8645356678165556016..comments2020-08-01T22:28:50.016-06:00Comments on Proactive Progressive Populism: The gravity of meshy hyperobjectsEdward Bergehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13864657929019204993noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7621529782651296685.post-58122214431045337382012-10-20T06:56:36.121-06:002012-10-20T06:56:36.121-06:00For the kennilingus meanings of the terms "do...For the kennilingus meanings of the terms "dominant monad" and "regnant nexus" see Excerpt D: http://www.kenwilber.com/Writings/PDF/excerptD_KOSMOS_2004.pdfEdward Bergehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13864657929019204993noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7621529782651296685.post-21077612682603919292012-10-20T06:51:22.690-06:002012-10-20T06:51:22.690-06:00Also recall that Derrida's iteration not only ...Also recall that Derrida's iteration not only repeats but adds something novel with each iteration, so that each loop is singular. The not yet is added to the always already. So here we have the unique differance at the core suobstance of each suobject that is nonetheless the 'universal' differance in the hyperobject. That endo-structural gravity of the latter is inescapable and shapes all interdependent suobjects within its influence. But this is still not a metaphysical or Platonic universe of All, since it is but one of many in a pluriverse where perhaps differance is not a regnant nexus or dominant monad in other hyperobjects?Edward Bergehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13864657929019204993noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7621529782651296685.post-46107260350334787322012-10-19T19:49:46.597-06:002012-10-19T19:49:46.597-06:00So using Swimme's universe as an example, the ...So using Swimme's universe as an example, the very physical properties inherent since its birth, like differance, are so vast and influential as to be a virtual eternity. But unlike Bryant's examples differance ain't goin' nowhere until the complete annihilation of the physical universe.Edward Bergehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13864657929019204993noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7621529782651296685.post-14023758840297769572012-10-19T19:33:52.928-06:002012-10-19T19:33:52.928-06:00Bryant's post on incorporeal machines* is inte...Bryant's post on incorporeal machines* is interesting. It's not quite what I'm getting at but is a twist on his usual fare with some similarities to my recent ruminations. A few excerpts:<br /><br />"There are two considerations that lead me to resist the move of reducing incorporeal machines to corporeal machines: Iterability and identity. Unlike corporeal machines that are singular and always exist at a particular time and place (while also having a duration), incorporeal machines have the curious feature of being iterable, while remaining identical. As an incorporeal machine, a novel, scientific theory, mathematical equation, grammatical rule, recipe, political ideology, perhaps genetic codes, etc., can exist in countless corporeal machines (books, newspapers, magazines, symphony performances, brains, computer data banks, conversations, etc.), while nonetheless remaining that incorporeal machine.<br /><br />"Incorporeal entities possess a potential eternity. Why potential rather than actual? Their eternity is only potential because, as I said, incorporeal machines can only exist with corporeal bodies. If an incorporeal being loses its corporeal body (inscription in paper, smoke, brain neurons, computer data banks, sound-waves, sand, etc.), it ceases to exist. It is lost. Consequently, the condition for the possibility of the eternal is iteration and inscription in some medium. The incorporeal must be repeated through activities of inscription in order to continue to exist."<br /><br />* http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/10/18/the-strange-ontology-of-incorporeal-machines-writing/#more-6428<br />Edward Bergehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13864657929019204993noreply@blogger.com