On Husserl etc.

I referenced our IPS discussion of Husserl in this prior post. In the IPS discussion to which it refers I provided quite a bit of reference material (see that link) and clarified my posts with the following:

The intersubjective lifeworld is largely unconscious so to what degree can it be “intentional?” And what is the relation of transpersonal theory/practice to this lifeworld? That is, can we have intentional, direct and complete transpersonal experiences of this ground? Now if we take Protevi's definition of intentionality as “not subjective, but is the 'between' of subject and object, the middle out of which objects and subjects are constituted,” then it makes sense as long as we don't presume to fully experience or know such a between, heeding Morris: "Speaking for the lifeworld as if one could step outside of it and know it directly inevitably leads one to 'invoke a cosmology,' a 'metaphysics of the thing-in-itself.'”

How does the collective interior evolve? Via the kind of structures Kennilingam suggests? Remember Foucault that genealogy doesn't so “evolve” through such rational structures as much as change by “contingent turns of history.”

Sean finds that Husserl has been misinterpreted by the likes of Foucault and Derrida to the point of being “downright inaccurate.” So I'm interested in specifically how so, since Sean finds both Levin and MP as being much more accurate, and Derrda is akin to them in some regards (explored ad nauseum in this forum). Also given that Husserl endorsed Fink and Fink is the main source of Derrida. Derrida is known for meticulously reading and understanding his subjects before critique. I can see how Derrida might have disagreed with Husserl, but to claim he was was downright inaccurate needs defense. A defense, I might add, that will be surely forthcoming under intense scrutiny by the Ph.D. oral defense committee.

I agree with Sean's point about the difficulty “really understand[ing]” any philosopher’s meaning, Husserl notwithstanding, especially in light of his being “notoriously difficult and cryptic.” Tell me about it, with Derrida another prime example. But 2 points here: a) Is there a “real” and true interpretation of Husserl, even from himself? and; b) perhaps one is also misconstruing Derrida's critique of Husserl, when Derrida might just be more in line with Husserl's project that one supposes? E.g., I agree with Sean when he says: “One way that I would articulate it [habitus] is as a middle way between social constructionism and transcendental essentialism.” This middle way is succinctly put by Protevi in the referenced quote and in fact is very much akin to Derrida on the topic.

Finally, for now, I too, like Balder, am interested in the project of an intersubjective (or in Varela's phenomenological term “interbeing”), integral, postmetaphysical enaction. So I'm with the general agenda and curious to see how others frame this endeavor. Which is of course the purpose of our forum.