AQAL objects & Tom Murray

The IPS OOO thread turned back to how AQAL might view objects, which let to a new thread on the work of Tom Murray. Following are the initial posts:

Balder:

Speaking of OOO and AQAL, Morton addresses AQAL in this post.  I will return to this -- for now, I just want to observe that I think he misreads the meaning of 'object' in AQAL.  His list of objects (the Pope, flapjacks, etc) could also be classified as objects in AQAL-speak.

theurj:

A couple of quick points. Yes, AQAL could classify such as holons. But If I'm not mistaken (and I might be, not keeping up with the kenndashians) kennilingus still adheres to the distinction between sentient and insentient holons. Not only does OOO challenge this form of correlationism but Edwards' critique of how kennilingus reduces the objective quadrant to exterior material stuff without the same developmental complexity as interior 'objects.' Granted there are places in kennilingus that say the material is just as complex, with the higher categories of subtle and causal 'exterior' objects, but this contention is neither consistent or coherent as we've examined before in this forum (probably the old one at Gaia). Also granted with the 'zones' there is an inside and outside to both interior and exterior quadrants but again Edwards breaks down the inconsistency in that AQAL concept and offers a way forward within the AQAL system. does so as well, with similar sounding arguments from his AQAL perspective. Morton gets at this bias in his comments. 

Also I'm reminded of Edwards' critique of how kennilingus reduces the objective quadrant to exterior material stuff without the same developmental complexity as interior 'objects.' Granted there are places in kennilingus that say the material is just as complex, with the higher categories of subtle and causal 'exterior' objects, but this contention is neither consistent or coherent as we've examined before in this forum (probably the old one at Gaia). Also granted with the 'zones' there is an inside and outside to both interior and exterior quadrants but again Edwards breaks down the inconsistency in that AQAL concept and offers a way forward within the AQAL system.

Balder:

Yes, I appreciate Edwards' critiques.  I consider his contributions to be part of "Integral thought" -- not confining it to Wilber.  What I was responding to was this remark by Morton:

Now we could do the same thing to every other set in the quadrant and sphere model. For instance, the difference between my use of interobjectivity and E/Z's use of the term is that for them, “object” just means “something that isn't social, human, sentient or noetic” or something like that. An AQAL object just is an ordinary object as it appears to non-examined, everyday human prejudice. Whereas for me, “object” can mean the Pope, wallabies, the Oort Cloud and flapjacks.

I have spoken with Sean about his ideas and know that he does not mean by object, "something that isn't social, human, sentient, or noetic" (as if the UR refers just to a particular class of interiorless things). 

theurj:

In excerpt D it notes that it will deal with zone 2, the outside of interiors. Excerpt C dealt with zone 1 (inside interiors) and that forthcoming excerpts (presumably E and F) will deal with  zones 3 and 4 (inside and outside of exteriors). The latter excerpts have not appeared to date but from figure 2 in D this would deal with the topics of autopoeisis, empiricism and systems theory, the stuff of Bryant's oeuvre. Perhaps these excerpts are awaiting the study and integration of OOO before release?

Also see Integral Ecology, where Sean maintains the distinction between quadrant-perspective and quadrivium-object (p. 176). Granted Sean has changed some views since then but does he still retain this correlationist view of kosmic address? It would seem so if we look at his more recent article referenced in this post on p. 11 of this thread (e.g, fn 23). Later in that page I question the kosmic addressing system with reference to past posts on the topic. He also says on p. 168, quoting Wilber:

"This is why I use the word sub-sist. There is a reality or a What that subsists and has intrinsic features but it doesn’t ex-ist without a Who and a How."

Balder:

I believe so, but I will need to review this paper to see how this might have changed.  (I'm heading out the door now, so I'll do this later).  Can you tell me why you think the quadrivium-object and quadrant-perspective distinction is correlationist?  As I said above, I do not feel Integral thought is correlationist in the sense frequently criticized (as anthropocentric).  It might still be organism-centric, but not anthropocentric.

Concerning distinguishing between sentient and insentient objects, I do think Edwards makes a good point.  But there does appear to be a qualitative difference between types of objects that we should account for somehow.  We can cut up, throw, burn, puree, squish, or otherwise roughly treat a flapjack, but it feels like quite a different act to do this to a live chicken, an elephant, or the Pope.  How would you approach this from an OOO perspective?

theurj:

This is related to some questions we're currently having in the OOO thread on correlationism but I decided to start a new thread focusing on this author. Tom Murray has some new articles at this page, one of which is “Embodied realisms and integral ontologies.” Therein he quotes Wilber from IS, p. 252.

“…all objects are first and foremost perspectives. NOT 'are seen from perspectives,' but ARE perspectives…there is no 'apart from' how a thing appears…'things' do not exist in a pregiven world.”

Murray then asks:

“There are several assumptions or implications here. The idea that our perception of the nature of objects, and even their appearance as objects, is constructed by our mental apparatus is generally accepted. But this quote leaves open the question of whether perspectives exist in a pregiven world (and whether they might reasonably be considered 'things'—which would lead to a contradiction).... Are perspectives then things that humans have/use, or are they fundamental components of the world? Wilber's claim that 'there is no apart from how a thing appears' seems to be taking the non-realist (or radical socialconstructivist) position that a world 'out there' does not exist.... Wilber's claim also appears to fall prey to what Roy Bhaskar calls the epistemic fallacy.... Yet in the larger context of his body of his work Wilber does not take a radically anti-realist or social constructivist position (nor fall prey to the epistemic fallacy)" (3).