Iteration, same difference

Still maintaining and changing the autonomy of the IPS OOO thread, more follows:

Which reminds me of Bryant's post on incorporeal virtual and eternal objects. He says that unlike corporeal objects, which are tied to a particular location, incorporeals are like hyperobjects in that they are everywhere and nowhere at once. They require a 'body' to manifest, but can do so in a number of bodies simultaneously, the same incorporeal substance iterated in each body across vast space-time.


And yet even here the incorporeal hyperobject is not the same identity in each manifestation, since interation itself is differance, i.e., each iteration, while being mostly the same, is infinitesimally different. E.g., the book Grapes of Wrath is slightly different with each reading, either by a different object or even the same object, given the unique conditions of that particular space-time local manifestation. That way the incorporeal hyperobject is not like some unchanging Platonic form.

Recall that even a smaller scale object's endo-structure changes due to interactions within an environment. Yes, it still retains a singular autonomy like no other despite the changes. But with those changes the endo-structure is unlike it was before the change; it is not the same being it was earlier. Iteration has retained most of what it was before, hence the seeming continuous identity. But Bryant assures us that differance requires such identity to always be split by its withdrawn absence, which causes not only its local manifestations to be different depending on conditions but its withdrawn core as well.

Given the thesis that this iterative differance is the endo-structural core (khora) of the universal hyperobject at large, it too iterates with each moment. It certainly appears to be an unchanging eternal form given the size and scope. But per Bryant it requires corporeals to manifest and thus change, and without which it too would dissipate and die. Hence like the SES quote we have our causal realm as foundation for the material, "not the goal of each and every thing but the Suchness of each and every thing." But unlike Wilber's causal it is not timeless and changeless.