Given the commentary to this post I was reminded of Libet's notions of the conscious mental field in this post,
which depends on the brain but emerges from it, and is not limited by
it. Which led me to recall Bryant's work on incorporeality. See for example the following posts: 1) A brief note on incorporeal machines; 2) The strange ontology of incorporeal machines: writing; 3) A few remarks on agency. Incorporeality, or trans-corporeality, will play a large part in his new book, Onto-Cartography.
For example in 1) he talks about how Deleuze and Guattari see the "planes of content and expression [as] independent, autonomous, and heterogeneous, functioning according to different principles." And that the plane of expression "can’t be treated as a mere effect of the base or of biological hard wiring." And he too asserts in 3) that " everything is material (even incorporeal entities!) and that there is
nothing outside of the world that conditions or overcodes everything
else such as Platonic forms, God, and so on." And in 3) he also noted that agency is self-directed and "can’t be found among the parts that compose [it]." More later.
In 1) above, in the comments section, someone asks Bryant if consciousness is corporeal or not. He replies: "It's a corporeal machine that operates a number of incorporeal machines."
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