More on integral semiotics

Continuing the discussion in this IPS thread. My first impression reminds me of Edwards' criticism of putting holons in quadrants rather than each holon having 4 quadrants. I think this applies to referents as well, in that each referent has 4 quads. Thus each referent has individual and social signifiers and signifieds in their respective quadrants. That is why referents can have kosmic addresses in a variety of quadrants, levels, lines etc.

Bryant's Borromean knot domains works better in this regard, as they don't track equivalently to the quadrants. He locates the referent in the Real domain and the Real can be both actual and virtual. We might therefore say that the Real has signifiers and signifieds, whether it is actual or not. As can the other two domains as well, given the withdrawn virtual of any domain in the 'center' of differance, itself being actual and virtual.


Given the overlaps of the domains, unlike the quadrants, hence we also get some shared spaces where they intermix and match and change into each other depending on contexts. So we can also say that the signified has the real and the signifier, as well as the signifier has the real and the signified. And all with actual and virtual aspects. They can be distinguished depending on the context or perspective used, the kosmic address, if you will. But there is no privileged perspective outside the kosmic address or (con)text. Hence even the definitions of signifiers, signifieds and the real are open to change and transformation.

We do not get this with kennlingus since his KA does have a transcendental signifier that is the very ground of KA in the first place as consciousness per se. It is right in line with the metaphysics of presence also in its strict dividing lines between the quadrants (domains) with little if any overlap.

Returning to holons we might then say that any holon has real, symbolic and imaginary domains, with each of those domains having actual and virtual aspects. Given the relations it really does appear to be more of a entangled knot than some distinct grid. These are not tidy little boxes with supreme autonomy but a different variety of interconnected autonomy and community. All within a strange mereology to boot that allows for emergence and 'levels,' but again not in a kennlingual or metaphysical way.

This also plays into Bryant's notions of corporeal and incorporeal, in line with the Lingam on some referents not being in the physical or sensorimotor worldspace. More on that later.