See the recent IPS postings on integral semiotics starting here with David and Balder discussing Desilet's critique. It goes on for a couple of pages. My response:
I don't think Derrida collapses signifiers and signfieds. My sense is that differance pervades
them so that they are distinct yet inseparable, mutually entailing as it
were. That is in accord with kennilingus on the relative side of the
street. As for the absolute side, there is ample evidence that the
Lingam espouses an ultimate transcendental signified in the metaphysical
and representational sense. One definition of metaphysics (there are
several) is in fact the Cartesian divide between subject and object,
absolute and immanent, i.e., formal operations. And there is no question
kennilingus engages that sort of reasoning with transcendental
signifieds. See earlier in this thread for but one example.
As for referents, I agree with the Lingam again in that it isn't a given
in itself but for different reasons. Agree that what any suobject can
know about it doesn't get at another in any totality, or even one
suobject within itself. There is always this hidden or withdrawn reserve
or excess. Hence any referent is open and fluid as well, up to and
including this thing called causal or ultimate awareness. Since with
integral semiotics one must also provide a kosmic address for the
'object' that a subject is apprehending, the object's address is
indefinite as well given its own withdrawn c(h)ore(a). The withdrawn
sort of functions like Wilber's Causal but in a more postmetaphysical
way imo. It is transcendetal though, not transcendent (see here). With that
distinction in mind I am all in for transcendental signifieds,
signifiers and referents.
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