Also, regarding his types of objects (dark, dim, bright, vogue), "these determinations are not features of objects but of the degree of relatedness enjoyed by a thing." Interesting.
And his emphasis on objects is to counter the anthropomophic epistemic fallacy we've discussed previously (as well as the metaphysics of presence above).
"My reason for beginning with things is two-fold: First, I believe now, more than ever, we need to attend to the role that nonhuman things play in assemblages, the gravity they enact, and how they organize relations within assemblages.... Second, I begin with objects because I think that if we begin with the thesis that 'things are related,' we won’t attend to what things are related in these assemblages because we’ll already have assumed that the relations are there. We won’t do what Michael and I have called 'cartography.'"
Contra Bennett he refutes holism, which implies "that everything is related to everything else." We saw this with Klein in this post (Batchelor thread) when she said "all things that are immutably related to it," meaning both reality and the awareness that apprehends it. He again goes into a constant theme about the political implications of such holism, and that we've also discussed ad nauseum, e.g. with inclusivism as but one example.