Continuing from the last post, from Lakoff & Johnson's Philosophy
in the Flesh:
"The phenomenological person, who through introspection alone can discover everything there is to know about the nature of mind and experience, is a fiction. Although we can have a theory of a vast, rapidly and automatically operating cognitive unconscious, we have no direct conscious access to its operation and therefore to most of our thought" (5).
"The phenomenological person, who through introspection alone can discover everything there is to know about the nature of mind and experience, is a fiction. Although we can have a theory of a vast, rapidly and automatically operating cognitive unconscious, we have no direct conscious access to its operation and therefore to most of our thought" (5).
“There is much to be said for traditional philosophical
reflection and phenomenological analysis. They can makes us aware of many
aspects of consciousness and, to a limited extent, can enlarge our capacities
for conscious awareness. Phenomenological reflection even allows us to examine
many of the background prereflective structures that lie beneath our conscious
experience. But neither method can adequately explore the cognitive
unconscious—the realm of thought that is completely and irrevocably
inaccessible to direct conscious introspection” (12).
Also see “the
embodied challenge” thread on the cognitive unconscious. And the Dennett
thread on privileged access.
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