Dynamic systems & development

In this FB IPS thread once again the subject of just what is integral has been raised. There are the proponents of kennilingus who take Wilber's work as the word of God. But also some of Wilber's sources like Piaget, and the neo-Piagetian model of hierarchical complexity, which Wilber twists at times beyond recognition to suit his own metaphysical agenda. One such issue is that of a development center of gravity that guides one's integrated worldview. And that such worldviews progress through increasingly complex stages of development.

However some developmentists that use dynamic systems think otherwise. Mascolo said:

"It follows that individuals never operate at any single level of development. Instead, they operate within a developmental range – a series of levels that vary with task, domain, context, emotional state, and so forth. Given such dynamic variation, there can be no broad-based stages of development. It is thus not helpful to think of a person or a person’s abilities as being 'in a stage' of development. Development does not move through a series of fixed steps; development operates more like a constructive Web" (6).

This work questions the notion that one integrated worldview (or center of gravity) governs all our thoughts and actions, let alone that these worldviews evolve in a stage-like fashion. Therefore at any point in time one's worldview might indeed be a mixture from the so-called worldview stages, with any given one, or combination, manifesting depending on the context.

Which of course feeds directly into the linked discussion of Peterson being integral or not. Bonnita noted early on that he might not represent integral in the sense of complex thinking but might be more like the Gebser sort of integral-aperspectivity.

"For Gebser, integral-aperspectival consciousness is not experienced through expanded consciousness, more systematic conceptualizations, or greater quantities of perspectives. In his
view, such approaches largely represent over-extended, rational characteristics. Rather, it involves an actual re-experiencing, re-embodying, and conscious re-integration of the living vitality of magic-interweaving, the imagination at the heart of mythic-feeling and the
purposefulness of mental conceptual thinking, their presence raised to a higher resonance, in order for the integral transparency to shine through" (111).

Gidley, J. (2007). "The evolution of consciousness as a planetary imperative." In Integral Review 5. 


Image schemas, as well as Edwards' different lenses, taken singly can represent the various theoretical ideologies. We've already seen how a focus on the container schema can lead to an ideology of objectivist hierarchical complexity. And how a focus on a cyclic image schema might lead to what Gebser called the mythic structure (or ideology). Gebser's integral-aperspectival (IA) structure though, at least according to Gidley, is a means to allow for all previous structures to be as they are and co-exist together simultaneously. The IA is not another isolated structure that transcends and replaces previous structures, including the mental. In this sense it breaks with the pattern of progression in deficient rational. And we see exactly this type of coordination of the various image schemas in Lakoff, that each has its place, none are replaced. Same for Edwards' lenses. This produces a new kind of transparent, postmeta paradigm of multiplicty, in Deleuzes's terms, or IA in Gebser's. One that is relative according to Lakoff, but also constrained by the real.

It's also relevant to my discussions with Bruce on how prepositional image schema might acts as a pre-linguistic interrelational matrix for the other parts of speech within a grammar. It's a different way of approaching philosophy (or anything) that is not dependent on ideological focusing on one (grammatical or otherwise) element without considering the broader context in which they relate. Edwards work on how these different lenses organize and operate together thus has an entirely different approach to meta-theory.