For Prasangika geeks

From Evan Thomson's feed today:

"It is not that there are some objects within the grasp of our cognitive capacities as well as some beyond them, but rather that the very concept of an object is something established by these capacities. It is not that parts of the world might not correspond to our linguistic and conceptual frameworks but that the idea of a structure of reality independent of these practices is incoherent." -- Jan Westerhoff Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka, p. 207.

And then there's Thakchoe's paper on semantic nominalism. The abstract:
"Buddhist semantic realists assert that reality is always non-linguistic, beyond the domain of conceptual thought. Anything that is conceptual and linguistic, they maintain, cannot be reality and therefore cannot function as reality. The Pra ̄saṅgika however rejects the realist theory and argues that all realities are purely linguistic—just names and concepts—and that only linguistic reality can have any causal function. This paper seeks to understand the Pra ̄saṅgika’s radical semantic nominalism and its philosophical justifications by comparing and contrasting it with the realistic semantic theories."