Saturday, January 14, 2012


Yes, that's presance,* an intentional misspelling to distinguish it from presence. Much like differance is to difference. The following comes from my IPS posts in both the mind and nature and patterns of wholeness threads referenced recently.

This post may be of relevance, or more aptly, presence. Mayhaps more neologistically and in Derridaen fashion, presance?

Bonnie makes some useful distinctions in language that appears quantum, so might serve as a bridge to Tom's ideas (or not). She distinguishes the epistemological field from the ontological dimension, e.g. this from her linked article above:

"The first and foremost difference is that unlike the Epistemological Field, where the forces are complementary, the anterior and posterior vectors of the Ontological Dimension are entangled. I use the term entangled to convey the characteristics of temporal simultaneity and spatial non-locality; but also to contrast it with the dualistic, trade-off characteristics of complementarity. Entanglement entails omni-directionality, coherence (unity) of event histories and the like" (130).

She brings in Levin's reading of Heidegger shortly thereafter with themes we've discussed here before.

I also like this metaphor, which seems apt of the ontologically withdrawn aspect, not a mere absence but more like the active absence Balder described in this thread. And all of which cannot be grasped by or within the epistemological field, something Bryant emphasizes with the epistemic fallacy.

"Relative to the experience of 'moving mind,' the ontological dimension, by contrast, has the feeling/aspect of stillness. However, this 'stillness' is not to be construed dualistically (that would be an epistemological reduction); rather, it is a dynamic stillness—like the axel of a cart wheel rolling down a hill" (133).

Also relevant to that thread, speaking of mereology, is the following epistemological fallacy that arises from trying to apply its tenets to the ontological dimension:

"Are the concepts (or perspectives) delimited by an implicit or explicit one/many divide, or, in other words, are they related as wholes and parts?" (132).

It seems when Tom uses the term wholeness he uses language that refers to Bonnie's ontological dimension, yet epistemologically it can get confused with the whole/part relation?

On pp. 135-6 she again hints at the withdrawn using openness as absence via Heidegger:

"This openness, rather, is also something experienced as a dynamic opening-up-to what is absent, what is be-coming—a kind of clearing that allows the presencing of Being. Heidegger borrowed a Greek term aletheia to describe the kind of ontological truth that is disclosed by an opening-up-to."

* Or perhaps prabsence, or even præbsǣnce, for that present absence and absent presence? According to the æ is known as the ash. It was used in early English, the long form (ǣ) being replaced by the e, the short form by the a. It hearkens back to a time when language was perhaps closer to the ontological being-in-the-world. Thus the first ash in præbsǣnce could be short (as in cat), the second long (as in met), essentially being pronounced and spelled prabsence in modern parlance.

I also like using the double ash due to the double (actually quadruple, aka fourfold) meaning of the term, being both/and and neither/nor present absence and absent presence. Hmm, could this be an ash-holon?

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