The Captain Metaphysics cartoon had me search for Bryant's paper "Time
of the object." In the search I discovered his updated version
subtitled: "Derrida, Luhmann and the processual nature of substances."
And it is within the book The Allure of Things: Process and Object in
Contemporary Philosophy (NY: Bloomsbury, 2014) edited by Roland Faber
and Andrew Goffy and available free at this link.
Relating to the Captain Metaphysics comic, I like this:
"What Derrida articulates in this passage is a variation of Aristotle’s
concept of primary substances; for the very being of primary substance
is to exceed and be detachable from every context. Hence, in the case of
New Historicism which strives to reduce an articulation to its context,
we encounter a sort of transcendental illusion where the historicist
is not discovering the contexture of relations that gave the
work meaning, but rather creating a contexture, a regime of attraction,
that generates meaning as an effect. It is for this reason that
I refer to substance under the title of presence as local manifestation, for the manifestation of any substance is a
function of its contingent context, such that every substance, in
principle, harbors the power of falling into other contexts and
thereby of manifesting itself otherwise than it does in this context.
[...] Derrida’s account of time and diffĂ©rance gives us one way of
providing a formal ontological demonstration for the thesis that
substances are withdrawn" (89-90).
And the conclusion, a variation on Edwards' syntegrity:
"Derrida
argues that we must abandon the thesis that the synthesis of time is
accomplished by a preexistent transcendental identity or unity that
affects the synthesis of traces of the past. Rather,
we must see the unity and identity of the substance as arising
from the interplay of these traces and differences themselves.
The substantiality of substance must, like Whitehead’s 'societies,'
be seen as that which perpetually produces itself from itself without a
homunculus presiding over the synthesis of these differences. In this
regard, the substantiality of substance, its identity and unity, would
not be an identity and unity that precedes this synthesis, but
would be the very activity of synthesis itself. It
is precisely an account of a decentralized process of synthesis in
autopoietic and allopoietic machines that Luhmann gives us" (90).
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