Wednesday, August 1, 2012

Kinds of holarchy

Continuing from the "what matters?" post in terms of holarchy, Balder is exploring Wilber's 20 tenets and how they might be coordinated with OOO. I referenced Mark Edwards' Ph.D. dissertation at this link. I agree that we can find useful correspondence with the 20 tenets and strange mereology. The latter though is fully immanent. It might also be transcendental as we've explored, but not transcendent in Wilber's sense. See for example footnote 26 to Excerpt A where he says:

"Are there any forms that were laid down as 'memory' in the involutionary sequence and which therefore show up as timelessly given forms that are present at the very start of evolution itself and operative at every point of evolution's unfolding? As involutionary givens, we have already postulated Eros/Agape and the morphogenetic tilt of manifestation. Are there any others?... Whitehead believed so: eternal objects, for example.... Certain physical laws described by mathematics.... A list of 20 proposed involutionary givens [tenets] can be found in chapter 2 of SES."

In chapter 6 of Edwards' dissertation he notes 3 kinds of holarchies which have different topographies and dynamics: developmental, governance and ecological (131). This might not only explain the differences between Wilber and Bryant's holarchies but also how to integrate them. In this ILR article Edwards goes into more detail on these 3 holarchical lenses, how they differ and are similar, how they can be confused, and how they can be integrated in a wider embrace. It seems kennilingus might focus more on developmental holarchies, while Bryant more on the ecological? Although the governance has to do with autopoeisis and self organization, so this could be a mix for Bryant.

In this ILR discussion with Kupers she addresses Edwards' three holarchies and comments on the ecological holarchy, noting something I've criticized in kennilingus: It

"allow[s] us to view the recursive and interdependent nature of apparent oppositions, dilemmas and paradoxes.... Therefore, I see as one main problem with the conventional AQAL scheme—though being parsimonious— that it is not complex and flexible nor specific and relational enough for approaching interrelated phenomena and events. These relational events require subsets of adequate perspectives and seeing the 'in-between.'"

Edwards thinks metatheorizing is indeed cross-paradigmatic:

"Meta-theorising moves beyond the recognition of plurality and consciously develops meta-paradigmatic positions."

Granted terms are mixed and matched with Commons' terms but what Edwards describes and enacts is an entirely novel field call metatheory. His extensive research also provides ample examples of those who have been working in the field for some time, and far exceeding (though including) kennilingus. I also like this:

"You’ll also notice that each of these categories of lenses has a particular pattern or form of expression. We have the holarchical, bipolar, cyclical, relational, standpoint and multiparadigm lens categories providing a total of 24 explanatory lenses. Investigating the relationships within and between these lenses is in itself a special branch of metatheorising. (It might be called 'The morphology of metatheory'). For example, there are various forms of confusion and conflation that exist between particular categories of lenses and I see these being committed over and over again. Holarchical lenses are often reduced to bipolar ones. Phases in the transition process lens are often confused with those of the developmental holarchy. Developmentalistis typically leave out relational lenses and post-modernists do the opposite. There are many ways in which these lens categories are conflated, confused and mixed or simply neglected. Showing that these lenses can be placed within morphological categories it might help to understand how some of these confusions can occur."

I'd be interested to see Bryant investigate Edwards and vice-versa. Especially in terms of morphology, or as Bryant calls it, topography.

And from the same link in the last post, this statement which indicates not only the window-frame metaphor used by Bryant, but that the frames humans use are inherent to a "morphological fault line in the Kosmos." Here he gets at some of the realist ontology of Bryant. Though for humans their particular windows are inherent to their particular embodiment, but windows per se can be more broadly construed to any object via onticology. Perhaps Windows 10.1?

"These lens categories tap into some basic relationships that exist in the human experience of reality. Consequently, they show up within every attempt to understand, explain, or get some handle on the complexity that exists within and around us and between us and through us. I see them as coming out of some kind of morphological fault line in the Kosmos, windows that we create and which we are drawn to look through, proclivities that we innately possess as sentient beings who act and imagine."

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