Following up on this post and ensuing discussion, Priest's article
he discusses relations and functions regarding truth values. The
Aristotelian principles against contradiction, i.e., the excluded middle
and non-contradiction, rely on the function of truth values. Priest's
solution around this is to make the values relations. But when it comes
to Buddhist emptiness he seems to mix and match functions and relations.
On one hand emptiness is based on relations, since nothing has an
inherent existence but is conditioned by its relations to other things.
But on the other hand it is based a function because the previous
relations relate only to conventional reality; ultimate reality per this other Priest article posit is as "pure form" (11), itself a preconditional function for conventional reality.
I.e., the relation between the truth values of relations and functions is itself a function. Which is of course Gorampa's assertion in an actual ultimate versus a nominal ultimate, where this function is metaphysical. Whereas Tsongkapa's assertion is that the relation between the truth values of relations and functions is itself a mutual relation, i.e., these two truths about emptiness themselves require that their interaction be relational. Emptiness in this case is not a metaphysical actual ultimate in opposition to conventional reality. The paradox is that this relation is also a function in that this is an ultimate(um) on the nature of existence, so it is both and neither a function and/or relation in the Aristotelian sense.
And as I stated earlier in the thread, this whole mess is clarified by difference, which is itself a transcendental precondition for, or function of, relational and conventional existence. Yet it is not metaphysical in the sense of being transcendent of said conventional existence, itself also dependently arisen from said existence and thus also a relational truth value. All very twisted and folded.
I need to get out of my head now, eat something, take a shit, something that doesn't require all this nominally ultimate proliferation on the withdrawn nature of the actual ultimate.
I.e., the relation between the truth values of relations and functions is itself a function. Which is of course Gorampa's assertion in an actual ultimate versus a nominal ultimate, where this function is metaphysical. Whereas Tsongkapa's assertion is that the relation between the truth values of relations and functions is itself a mutual relation, i.e., these two truths about emptiness themselves require that their interaction be relational. Emptiness in this case is not a metaphysical actual ultimate in opposition to conventional reality. The paradox is that this relation is also a function in that this is an ultimate(um) on the nature of existence, so it is both and neither a function and/or relation in the Aristotelian sense.
And as I stated earlier in the thread, this whole mess is clarified by difference, which is itself a transcendental precondition for, or function of, relational and conventional existence. Yet it is not metaphysical in the sense of being transcendent of said conventional existence, itself also dependently arisen from said existence and thus also a relational truth value. All very twisted and folded.
I need to get out of my head now, eat something, take a shit, something that doesn't require all this nominally ultimate proliferation on the withdrawn nature of the actual ultimate.
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