Some good stuff from the archives:
From this post of mine:
"Wilber's metaphysical ground wherein all forms arise [...] seems much more like Plato's archetypal
realm of Ideal forms that step down into the sensible world and
'in'form it. Granted Wilber doesn't see them as 'pre-formed' but rather
much more amorphous involutionary and morphogenetic 'potentials.' Still,
it seems this is part of the involutionary versus evolutionary
dualistic scheme with one side being origin and absolute, with the other
being result and relative. Derrida's differant khora is both outside
and within that duality, not taking sides, as it were, but providing the
stage upon which they play out their differences and similarities."
From this post of Caputo commenting on Derrida:
“When we think of Plato we think of the two worlds or regions
allegorized in the cave: the upper world of the intelligible paradigms,
the sphere of invisible and unchanging being in the sun of the Good that
shines over all, as opposed to the sensible likenesses of the forms in
the changing, visible world of becoming.... When presented with a neat
distinction or opposition of this sort—and this distinction inaugurates
philosophy, carves out the very space of 'meta-physics'—Derrida will
not, in the manner of Hegel, look for some uplifting, dialectical
reconciliation of the two in a higher third thing, a concrete universal,
which contains the 'truth' of the first two. Instead, he will look
around—in the text itself—for some third thing that the distinction
omits, some untruth, or barely remnant truth, which falls outside the
famous distinction, which the truth of either separately or both
together fails to capture, which is neither and both of the two.
"In the Timaeus the missing third thing, a third nature or type—khora—is
supplied by Plato himself. Khora is the immense and indeterminate
spatial receptacle in which the sensible likenesses of the eternal
paradigms are 'engendered,' in which they are 'inscribed' by the
Demiurge, thereby providing a 'home' for all things.... This receptacle
is like the forms inasmuch as it has a kind of eternity: it neither is
born or dies, it is always already there, and hence beyond temporal
coming-to-be and passing away; yet it does not have the eternity of the
intelligible paradigms but a certain a-chronistic a temporality. Because
it belongs neither to the intelligible nor the sensible world Plato
says it is 'hardly real.' Moreover, while it cannot be perceived by the
senses but only by the mind, still it is not an intelligible object of
the mind, like the forms. Hence, Plato says it is not a legitimate son
of reason but is apprehended by a spurious or corrupted logos, a hybrid
or bastard reasoning. Khora in neither intelligible being nor sensible
becoming, but a little like both, the subject matter of neither a true
logos nor a good mythos” (83-4).
From this post on Sallis' Chorology:
"Khora subverts the whole logic of identity and essence
expressed in the phrase 'as such,' and hence problematizes the very
possibility of speaking of 'khora itself' as though khora had an identity like any other being. We are firmly caught in a double bind that requires that we differentiate khora from its images while recognizing that such a differentiation is problematic and even impossible. As Timaeus says, only if khora is radically indeterminate and formless -- only if it escapes the order of property and propriety -- can khora receive the properties and formal determinations that first makes the kosmos possible. Khora
hovers on the very edge of nothingness, never showing itself as itself,
but only in conjunction with the presence of the elemental bodies, as a
trace of 'something,' which can never itself be made present. It is
thus 'something' very much like what Derrida named différance: an
originary spacing and 'differencing' that presence presupposes and
that, as a condition for the possibility (and paradoxically the
impossibility) of presence, can never itself be present."
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