The philosophy of consciousness

From the archive:

And of course let's see what Wilber said about Habbie's critique of the philosophy of consciousness in Integral Spirituality:

"Habermas calls monological knowledge by various names, particularly 'the philosophy of the subject' and the 'philosophy of consciousness'—both of which he and every postmodern theorist worth their salt completely savaged. The philosophy of the subject' simply takes it that an individual subject is aware of phenomena, whereas that subject is actually set in cultural contexts of which the subject is totally unaware. The philosophy of consciousness' is the similar assumption, namely, that there is consciousness and that phenomena present themselves to consciousness, either individual or a collective or store-house consciousness (e.g.,alayavijnana). Every meditative and contemplative tradition makes this assumption. And it is simply wrong" (Chapter 1).

""The] myth of the given, which includes [....] the belief that the consciousness of an individual will deliver truth. This is why Habermas calls the myth of the given by the phrase 'the philosophy of consciousness' [....] So consciousness itself is deficient--whether personal or transpersonal, whether pure or not pure, essential or relative, high or low, big mind or small mind, vipassana, bare attention, centering prayer, contemplative awareness--none of them can see these other truths" (Chapter 8).

And then there's Wilber's discussion of 'right view' in IS, quoting Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche:

"Without a conceptual framework, meditative experiences would be totally incomprehensible. What we experience in meditation has to be properly interpreted, and its significance—or lack thereof—has to be understood. This interpretative act requires appropriate conceptual categories and the correct use of those categories. […] Meditative experiences are in fact impossible without the use of conceptual formulations" (112).

Wilber sums up: "Meditative experience per se--that simply does not exist" (112).