We've investigated Damasio's various forms of consciousness, from proto to core to narrative, as well as Dehaene's 2 forms. This Scientific American article reiterates at least the 2 different kinds.
"Jonathan Schooler has established a clear distinction between conscious and meta-conscious processes. Whereas both types entail the qualities of experience, meta-conscious processes also entail what he called re-representation. [...] Attention plays an important role is in re-representation; that is, the conscious knowledge of
an experience, which underlies introspection. Subjects cannot
report—not even to themselves—experiences that aren’t re-represented.
Nothing, however, stops conscious experience from occurring without re-representation. [...] Clearly, the assumption that consciousness is limited to re-represented
mental contents under the focus of attention mistakenly conflates
meta-consciousness with consciousness proper."
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.