Friday, January 31, 2014

Kennilingus critique and so on

The following is in response to some ponderings in this IPS  thread, looking at an ITC article by Kelly, Robbert and Mickey:

The AQAL tool has been one of my focuses throughout the forum in a host of threads, most recently in the Fold thread. Where it is useful and where it is not. How it combines with the WC lattice and how it can be improved. How the very nature of altitude and integral thinking is formulated by kennilingus based on a certain type of mereological complexity, and how other forms of mereological complexity change that dynamic drastically. And then how might the AQAL, lattice and other tools look thereafter, and how does that change their functionality?

Related to the other thread on defining IPS, I've explored in depth the meanings of the words integral, postmetaphysical, and spirituality, not just gathering, comparing and summarizing various sources, but adding my own small contributions as to how they might weave and cohere into my twisted (folded) and ideosyncratic vision of what it is, i.e, the Real.

As to Sean Kelly on Morin, I've been exploring that too in the Fold thread and will have more to say on that forthcoming. As but one example, from this post I commented on one of his articles:

"In the above article we see the recurrent themes of this thread. For example, the relationship of two poles in a dichotomy is dialogic rather than dialectic, i.e., they retain their autonomy yet are inseparable from the other yet are not subsumed in a higher synthesis. Which of course applies to the sort of mereology one employs, holographic (Morin) or holarchical (Wilber). Morin is much more aligned with the strange mereology of OOO. Kelly sees Wilber's variety as idealistic, a criticism I've expounded at length. And Kelly, like me, thinks that all this plays into how we interpret what an integral 'level' even means."

However later in the thread I was discussing how Laske uses Hegel's dialectic, and that there is a 'synthesis' of sorts but not the way Hegel intended (and the way Wilber and the MHC define it).

"Also on 16 he discusses the usual Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula, but given the above it seems to be quite different from than that used by Wilber and Commons. At 17 this is clarified noting that his form of dialectics requires depth-first, instead of breadth-first as in Wilber. Therefore 'integral thinking fails at the preservative negation of what it negates and then transcends, missing the dialectical moment while transcending.'

"He uses technical terms here with which I'm not familiar but my translation is that Wilber, in typical formop and metaphysical fashion, sublates the 'other' in the new synthesis as in set theory, whereas Laske's synthesis preserves the other in mutual entailment more like Zalamea's math using Peirce (here and following). It also seems to support my notion that postmetaphysical thinking spirals back down in depth to perserve/integrate/synthesize (or de/re) the absences or gaps dissociated by metaphysical formop and its more complicated or sophisticated metaphysical extensions a la the MHC. Therefore this spiraling down in depth is simultaneously spiraling up in height or breadth, like our image schema that do both from the middle."

I'm culling a lot of different perspectives and yet meshing (or messing?) them in ways that none of them do by themselves, or in other combinations.

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