More on a dialectic of differance

Here are a few excerpts from the "complexity and pomo" thread starting with this post and following quoting Montuori:

"And this is in many ways Morin’s central contribution—to point out that there are problems, such as the human/nature or two culture split, that must be approached with a radically different way of thinking, a way of thinking that, as Morin states, is not disjunctive (either/or), but connects, without the Hegelian assumption that the dialectic will always lead to a new synthesis" (10-11).

Also recall this post earlier in the thread quoting Kelly, an excerpt:

"This description leaves no doubt that vision-logic, as Wilber conceives of it, is more or less identical with the Hegelian dialectic and its process of 'sublation' (aufheben). While Morin honors Hegel for having recognized, with the dialectic, 'the existence of a principle of negativity which transforms all things, all beings, all acts into their opposites', he faults Hegel for considering contradiction a transitory 'moment' of the Aufhebung, a moment which is ultimately annulled in the 'synthesis' of the third term. Wilber’s vision-logic is subject to the same strictures, particularly insofar as it subserves the idealist metaphysics associated with the root metaphor of the Great Chain of Being. Although the notion of vision-logic represents a significant step beyond the formal-operational thinking typical of the mature (Western) mental ego, it must, like the Hegelian dialectic, 'itself be sublated in a dialogic… that instigates the interaction, through the joining in a manner at once complementary… and antagonistic, of two logics—auto-logic and eco-logic”.

Also of relevance the following from Anselmo's "Philosophical sources for Morin's sociology":

"If, however, on the one hand the Hegelian dialectic has the proper requisites to sustain a complex thought, in that it is based on the idea, for example, that contradiction can be found in everything and that it plays a generative role, or on the idea that overcoming it starts from a negation, on the other Morin still seems to find it insufficient.

'It is monist in the idea it starts from, and therefore does not allow enough space for the meeting, that is, for the random element which intervenes in the formation of a dialectic: hence it eliminates chance and becomes an almost necessary movement which, despite the desire too overcome it, recalls deterministic mechanics (Morin,1987, p. 181).'

"In Morin’s opinion, although he recognizes the importance of the destructuring event, Hegel still places it within an auto-generated process that totally coincides with the development of the dialectic of the Spirit; in other words, the event, the hetero-generative, what Hegel defines as 'negative,' is completely integrated into the auto-generative. This might be another form of rationalization, another perhaps less explicit way of eliminating randomness, symbol of risk and the unknown; yet idealism seems like a soft rationalism, a conception in which the structures of the Spirit include a transparent world without meeting irreducible and refractory residues. Hegel’s historical idealism causes the world to obey an auto-generated process that coincides with the development of the dialectic of the Spirit, thus reality coincides with the rational. [...] In his opinion, a scienza nuova must consider chance, randomness, and disorder not as eliminable once and for all, but as complementary constituents of order and regularity, the structure of reality itself. Nor in this case can contradiction be considered a transitory moment that leads to overcoming, or to synthesis, but as something that continues to remain, in that it is a structural aspect of reality" (475).