"Houlgate suggests that dialectical thinking is pre-suppositionless in the sense of an attitude of mind open to being aware of, and critical of, its own assumptions, and encourages untrammeled thinking beyond the constraints of formal logic. [...] In short, any content, when considered from a pre-suppositionless stance, will spontaneously unfold its implications following the dynamic inherent in untrammeled thought itself (Adorno, 1993; 2008)" (2).
And from the ILR article:
"Negativity is a gift of human awareness that, as Hegel showed, only comes to those who are able to practice pre-suppositionless thinking (Houlgate, 2006). Such thinking is unconstrained by ideologies, habitual assumptions, single organizing principles (such as linear causalities), logical hierarchies, or anything that gets in the way of 'seeing what is before us,' as opened up through dialog and reflection (Hegel, 1812; 1969)."
In this post I'm referencing Torbert's triple-loop learning, associated with stages of development. Nonetheless his notion of intentional attention
"keeps up triple-looping around even the highest (as yet), transformational level so that one can consciously choose what level(s), and to what degree(s) and or mixtures, one might enact from among them depending on the unique particulars of a given circumstance. This sounds much more akin to Gebser's integral-apersectival as I pointed out in the real/false reason thread."
And like Laske's pre-suppositionless thinking.
And of course this Gidley quote on Gebser, which I've used in several posts and threads:
"For Gebser, integral-aperspectival consciousness is not experienced through expanded consciousness, more systematic conceptualizations, or greater quantities of perspectives. In his view, such approaches largely represent over-extended, rational characteristics. Rather, it involves an actual re-experiencing, re-embodying, and conscious re-integration of the living vitality of magic-interweaving, the imagination at the heart of mythic-feeling and the purposefulness of mental conceptual thinking, their presence raised to a higher resonance, in
order for the integral transparency to shine through" (111).
Gidley, J. (2007). "The evolution of consciousness as a planetary imperative." In Integral Review 5.
"For Gebser, integral-aperspectival consciousness is not experienced through expanded consciousness, more systematic conceptualizations, or greater quantities of perspectives. In his view, such approaches largely represent over-extended, rational characteristics. Rather, it involves an actual re-experiencing, re-embodying, and conscious re-integration of the living vitality of magic-interweaving, the imagination at the heart of mythic-feeling and the purposefulness of mental conceptual thinking, their presence raised to a higher resonance, in
order for the integral transparency to shine through" (111).
Gidley, J. (2007). "The evolution of consciousness as a planetary imperative." In Integral Review 5.
And my commentary to that Gidley quote in this post follows:
"Another connection occurring to me (as gift from my Muse) is that these image schemas, as well as Edwards' different lenses, taken singly can represent the various theoretical ideologies. We've already seen how a focus on the container schema can lead to an ideology of objectivist hierarchical complexity. And using Bonnie's talk above, how a focus on a cyclic image schema might lead to what Gebser called the mythic structure (or ideology). Gebser's integral-aperspectival (IA) structure though, at least according to Gidley (2007),* is a means to allow for all previous structures to be as they are and co-exist together simultaneously. The IA is not another isolated structure that transcends and replaces previous structures, including the mental. In this sense it breaks with the pattern of progression in deficient rational. And we see exactly this type of coordination of the various image schemas in Lakoff, that each has its place, none are replaced. Same for Edwards' lenses. This produces a new kind of transparent, postmeta paradigm of multiplicty, in Deleuzes's terms, or IA in Gebser's. One that is relative according to Lakoff, but also constrained by the real."
That was almost 2 years ago and I'm still trying to work out the same/differences in basic and transitional structures, what is included and what is replaced. Which of course this thread is the most recent example, culling past posts/threads with new material and sources with a few new insights. But I'm still not there yet.
"Another connection occurring to me (as gift from my Muse) is that these image schemas, as well as Edwards' different lenses, taken singly can represent the various theoretical ideologies. We've already seen how a focus on the container schema can lead to an ideology of objectivist hierarchical complexity. And using Bonnie's talk above, how a focus on a cyclic image schema might lead to what Gebser called the mythic structure (or ideology). Gebser's integral-aperspectival (IA) structure though, at least according to Gidley (2007),* is a means to allow for all previous structures to be as they are and co-exist together simultaneously. The IA is not another isolated structure that transcends and replaces previous structures, including the mental. In this sense it breaks with the pattern of progression in deficient rational. And we see exactly this type of coordination of the various image schemas in Lakoff, that each has its place, none are replaced. Same for Edwards' lenses. This produces a new kind of transparent, postmeta paradigm of multiplicty, in Deleuzes's terms, or IA in Gebser's. One that is relative according to Lakoff, but also constrained by the real."
That was almost 2 years ago and I'm still trying to work out the same/differences in basic and transitional structures, what is included and what is replaced. Which of course this thread is the most recent example, culling past posts/threads with new material and sources with a few new insights. But I'm still not there yet.
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