Friday, May 18, 2012

Incorporeal virtuality?

Continuing from this post, Lorraine says in chapter 2 of D&G:

“Deleuze takes the notion of the incorporeal realm of the event....the time of this realm of becomings is the time of Aion – an achronilogical time where everything has always has already happened and is yet to come....the 'pure event'” (32).

He goes on to describe the pure event in much the same terms as DeLanda, a virtual that does not apparently ever actualize. Bryant notes that not all of the withdrawn virtual is ever actualized in toto, but that some of it is usually actualized via exo-relations. This seems quite different from Lorraine's (and apparently DeLanda's) version, which forever remain virtual in a separate realm. This is highlighted by Lorraine:

“In the achronilogical time of Aion all events can relate in a pure becoming freed from the restrictions of physical becoming” (34).

Obviously not so with Bryant's virtual realm. In TDOO Bryant uses Deleuze's virutal but admits it is his recontextualizatin and it differs from Deleuze's own use. For example:

“As such, the virtual...refers to powers and capacities belonging to an entity. And in order for an entity to have powers or capacities, it must actually exist. In this connection, while the virtual refers to potentiality, it would be a mistake to conflate this potentiality with the concept of a potential object. A potential object is an object that does not exist but which could come to exist. By contrast, the virtual is strictly a part of a real and existing object” (3.2).

This is not at all a pure event “freed from the restrictions of physical becoming.” He goes on:

“In evoking Deleuze's concept of the virtual, we must proceed with caution.... he is committed to the thesis that there is only one substance that is then broken up into discrete entities through a process of actualization.... The suggestion here is that the virtual seems to consist of a single continuum, such that there is only one virtual, one substance, that is then partitioned into apparently distinct entities” (3.2)

It is this single continuum of the pure event that allows for such readings of non-material virtuality that somehow underlies matter and gives it form, ideas Bryant repeatedly refutes. As does Derrida's an-archic khora and his sense of ordinal time, which Bryant lays out quite well. Lorraine is trying to make connections between Deleuze and Derrida based on the above but I don't see it.

Also note in chapter 3.2 Bryant goes into Protevi's reading of Deleuze on the virtual. But he thinks that Protevi, while also recontextualizing him, nonetheless attributes things to Delequze not there to begin with.

1 comment:

  1. My bad, the Lorraine quotes are from BDD, not D&G (referenced in the last post).


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