Saturday, September 28, 2013

Transcendental signifiers, signifieds and referents

See the recent IPS postings on integral semiotics starting here with David and Balder discussing Desilet's critique. It goes on for a couple of pages. My response:

I don't think Derrida collapses signifiers and signfieds. My sense is that differance pervades them so that they are distinct yet inseparable, mutually entailing as it were. That is in accord with kennilingus on the relative side of the street. As for the absolute side, there is ample evidence that the Lingam espouses an ultimate transcendental signified in the metaphysical and representational sense. One definition of metaphysics (there are several) is in fact the Cartesian divide between subject and object, absolute and immanent, i.e., formal operations. And there is no question kennilingus engages that sort of reasoning with transcendental signifieds. See earlier in this thread for but one example.

As for referents, I agree with the Lingam again in that it isn't a given in itself but for different reasons. Agree that what any suobject can know about it doesn't get at another in any totality, or even one suobject within itself. There is always this hidden or withdrawn reserve or excess. Hence any referent is open and fluid as well, up to and including this thing called causal or ultimate awareness. Since with integral semiotics one must also provide a kosmic address for the 'object' that a subject is apprehending, the object's address is indefinite as well given its own withdrawn c(h)ore(a). The withdrawn sort of functions like Wilber's Causal but in a more postmetaphysical way imo. It is transcendetal though, not transcendent (see here). With that distinction in mind I am all in for transcendental signifieds, signifiers and referents.

No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.