See Taibbi's as usual fine reporting here. Some excerpts:
"But it would take half a generation – till now, basically – to
understand the most explosive part of the bill [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act], which additionally
legalized new forms of monopoly, allowing banks to merge with heavy
industry.[...] Today, banks like Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs own
oil tankers, run airports and control huge quantities of coal, natural
gas, heating oil, electric power and precious metals. They likewise can
now be found exerting direct control over the supply of a whole galaxy
of raw materials crucial to world industry and to society in general,
including everything from food products to metals like zinc, copper,
tin, nickel and, most infamously thanks to a recent high-profile
scandal, aluminum."
"Then, just for kicks, they're also betting on the timing and efficiency
of these same industrial processes in the financial markets – buying and
selling oil stocks on the stock exchange, oil futures on the futures
market, swaps on the swaps market, etc. Allowing one company to control the supply of crucial physical
commodities, and also trade in the financial products that might be
related to those markets, is an open invitation to commit mass
manipulation. It's something akin to letting casino owners who take book
on NFL games during the week also coach all the teams on Sundays. [...] In these new, even scarier kinds of manipulations, banks that own whole
chains of physical business interests have been caught rigging prices in
those industries."
"Basically, a bank or a trading company wants to buy commodities cheap
in the present and sell them for a premium as futures. This trade,
sometimes called 'arbitraging the contango,' works best if the cost of
storing your oil or metals or whatever you're dealing with is negligible
– you make more money off the futures trade if you don't have to pay
rent while you wait to deliver. So when financial firms suddenly start buying oil tankers or
warehouses, they could be doing so to make bets pay off, as part of a
speculative strategy – which is why the banks' sudden acquisitions of
metals-storage companies in 2010 is so noteworthy."
"We need to make prices. The head of Chase's commodities
division actually said this, out loud, and it speaks to both the general
unlikelihood of God's existence and the consistently low level of
competence of America's regulators that she was not immediately zapped
between the eyebrows with a thunderbolt upon doing so. Instead, the
government sat by and watched as a curious phenomenon developed at all
of these new bank-owned warehouses, in the aluminum markets in
particular. [...] 'In layman's terms, they were artificially jacking up the shipping and handling costs.' [...] The result of all this was a bottlenecking of aluminum supplies. A
crucial industrial material that was plentiful and even in oversupply
was now stuck in the speculative merry-go-round of the bank finance
trade."
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