No one lens rules them all

Continuing this post, I'm reminded of what Mark Edwards (2010) said about viewing reality through different lenses:

"In general, theorists rely on only a small number of conceptual lenses in developing their explanations of organisational transformation. This means that, for example, process theorists ignore structural lenses, such as those used by multilevel theorists, and developmental theorists make very little use of the transition process or learning lenses. Theorists who come from a standpoint or relational perspective often neglect the developmental and multilevel lenses and those lenses expressed as bipolar dualisms. In fact, the extensive list of lenses in Table 7.1 suggests that most theorists are relying on a relatively limited conceptual base in developing explanations for transformational occurrences" (134).

Lakoff's (1999) similar sentiment from a metaphoric angle:

"The science and the social sciences all use causal theories, but the metaphors for causation can vary widely and thus so can the kinds of causal inferences you can draw. Again, there is nothing wrong with this. You just have to realize that causation is not just one thing. There are many kinds of modes of causation, each with different logical inferences, that physical, social, and cognitive scientists attribute to reality using different metaphors for causation. Again, it is important to know which metaphor for causation you are using. Science cannot be done without metaphors of all sorts, starting with a choice of metaphors for causation. Most interestingly, if you look at the history of philosophy, you will find a considerable number of theories of causation. When we looked closely at the philosophical theories of causation over the centuries, they all turned out to be one or another of our commonplace metaphors for causation. What philosophers have done is to pick their favorite metaphor for causation and put it forth as an eternal truth."

Alderman (Sophia Speaks, 2019) explores similar ground through grammatical lenses:

"A broad survey of philosophy from the perspective of multiple grammatical lenses, in fact, makes it clear that many philosophical systems have been implicitly or explicitly organized around one or another of the major parts of speech. Importantly, especially for those interested in integral theory as a 'theory for anything' or as a form of 'integral methodological pluralism' (IMP), the deep grammatical commitments or foci of these traditions, and their relationships to each other, are not things readily disclosed when we rely upon [one lens] alone."