An interesting twist to our recent ruminations on species can be found in this 10/29/12 Bryant post on ecological populations.
"An ecological orientation focuses not in discrete, individual entities, but rather looks at the existence of these entities in a network of relations to other entities defined by interdependencies, feedback loops, and hierarchical relations between what is dominant and subordinate within that ecology. In other words, the fact that something exists is not, within an ecological framework, as important as how that thing is situated in a network of interdependencies to other entities and questions of how much influence that type of entity exercises."
He then frames this in an ecology of ideas, using the term species for categories like phenomenology and deconstruction. He uses this to explore ecologies of dominance within academia, one species versus another vying for dominance. But I'd like to direct it back to our discussion of hyperobjects. For it is in these species-hyperobjects where their own endo-structural substance dominates the individual suobjects within it. Recall the example that differance is part of the endo-structural substance of our physical universe, and no individual suobject can step outside of differance.
Again we have no problem with smaller species like humanoid directing the general manifestation of its embodiment. Granted each human body displays uniqueness, but nonetheless it is still much more alike as a species despite individual differences. And the humanoid substance of species itself can and does change over time, as does the universal substance of differance itself. Still, the species hyperobject at any scale still rules for the most part in most individual circumstances.
"An ecological orientation focuses not in discrete, individual entities, but rather looks at the existence of these entities in a network of relations to other entities defined by interdependencies, feedback loops, and hierarchical relations between what is dominant and subordinate within that ecology. In other words, the fact that something exists is not, within an ecological framework, as important as how that thing is situated in a network of interdependencies to other entities and questions of how much influence that type of entity exercises."
He then frames this in an ecology of ideas, using the term species for categories like phenomenology and deconstruction. He uses this to explore ecologies of dominance within academia, one species versus another vying for dominance. But I'd like to direct it back to our discussion of hyperobjects. For it is in these species-hyperobjects where their own endo-structural substance dominates the individual suobjects within it. Recall the example that differance is part of the endo-structural substance of our physical universe, and no individual suobject can step outside of differance.
Again we have no problem with smaller species like humanoid directing the general manifestation of its embodiment. Granted each human body displays uniqueness, but nonetheless it is still much more alike as a species despite individual differences. And the humanoid substance of species itself can and does change over time, as does the universal substance of differance itself. Still, the species hyperobject at any scale still rules for the most part in most individual circumstances.
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