Sunday, March 31, 2013

The consistency of paraconsistency

Continuing the introduction of Realist Magic, he talks of the Rift between I and me, between the reflexive and nonreflexive pronoun. My associative Muse thought immediately of how Edwards uses the I and me as the inner and out zones of a first-person holon from Part 7 of "Through AQAL Eyes."

The I is an suobject's withdrawn core, the me is a suobject's relations and qualities. Again with the inner/outer distinction I criticized above. But the Rift is the irreducible gap between them, the chorismos (akin to chora or khora?). It is here he gets into Priest's paraconsistent logic as supplement to the law of noncontradiction, much like I discussed above with differance. A first person holon is both, yet neither, but if we accept that the withdrawn is the inner I then it is not the Rift or differance per se. If we translate the above diagram into the Borromean knot though  we see the Rift in the center, only there are 3 aspects to a holon instead of 4. In the above diagram then the intersection of the 4, the X, must represent the Rift. I talked about this X as the Cross before so will need to find those links.
Still, something is not right with the notion of the withdrawn residing in the I only instead of the X. The X can also be see as two Is crossing, i.e., the I-I, another intuition that needs some contemplation.

He talks of the causal Rift in terms of being figuratively "in front of" objects, hence not the objects themselves. And yet it is the objects themselves that emanate this Rift, since it is not a separate space-time in which they exist. This sounds more like what I'm trying to articulate.

Later in the introduction Morton said:

"There is already a Rift between an object and its aesthetic appearance, a Rift within the object itself. Causality is not something that happens between objects, like some coming out party or freely chosen bargain into which things enter. It pours constantly from a single object itself, from the chōrismos between its essence and its appearance."

So the Rift is between an object's inner/outer divide, its virtual proper being and its local manifestations, its domestic and foreign relations. As I previously noted, it is not its withdrawn inner relations but in the relation between its withdrawn core and its relations with other objects. It is this differance of the object which is neither presence nor absence, the gap or Rift 'in front of,' antecedent to or inherent within each object.
Now he's also noting that because of the above each object creates its own space-time, its own gravity in Bryant's parlance. But also recall per Bryant that smaller objects in any assemblage get caught in the more powerful gravity of the assemblage itself. Yes, the smaller objects retain their own structural autonomy, yet that autonomy is overridden to some degree, perhaps even a great if not complete degree, by the endo-relational core of the larger assemblage, an object in its own right.

Recall I said the word hyperobject does not appear even once in this book. And it is here I'm finding the inconsistency. Hyperobjects are still objects, nonlocal or not. And it is within their immense gravity that we as part of that assemblage submit to their differance. This goes for our physical universe as well, being a humongous hyperobject with its own Rift. Hence the Rift is inherent and Real, differance is the core/khora/chorismos. And inside/outside distinctions, though useful, become meaningless in terms of The Rift.

Later he said:

"An object is therefore both itself and not-itself, at the very same time.... Because objects are themselves and not-themselves, the logic that describes them must be paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic: that is, the logic must be able to accept that some contradictions are true."

Sure, this is sort of what I'm saying. Inside and outside are different yet the same, they are not either/or, our formal logic of either inside and outside doesn't apply. Even though we might loosen up to be paraconsistent we still retain consistency. And it still seems to me there is some inconsistency within Morton's paraconsistent redo, and tied to his particular brand of shentong Buddhism, all noted previously in this thread. See the extended discussion on hyperobjects that began on p. 81 of the OOO thread and ran for several pages.

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