I
will reiterate some posts from other threads that demonstrate that if
anything would qualify as a paraconsistent, both/and/neither/nor
vision-logic of the fold, this would be it. And of a sort one just does
not find in kennilingus.
From this post
quoting "Alegebras, geometries, and topologies of the fold: Deleuze,
Derrida and quasi-mathematical thinking (with Leibniz and Mallarme)" by
Arkady Plotnitsky.
“Godel's findings fundamentally undermine
the belief that mathematics could provide an impeccible model of truth
and proof. […] Derrida's undecideability extends Godel's. It goes
without saying that it is not a question of abandoning logic, but of
establishing the limits within which logic would apply and of exploring
the areas where one must operate beyond these limits (but never
absolutely outside them)” (108-09).
Which reminds me of a few other sources in the forum. E.g, see this post of Norris on Badiou's reading of Derrida, excerpt following:
“Thus Derridean deconstruction, as
distinct from its various spin-offs or derivatives, necessarily
maintains a due respect for those axioms or precepts of classical logic
(such as bivalence and excluded middle) that have to be applied right up
to the limit—the point where they encounter some instance of strictly
irresolvable aporia—if such reading is to muster any kind of
demonstrative force” (175).
“Derrida’s classic essays must involve...a strong analytical grasp of the logical or logicosemantic
structures that are thereby subject to a dislocating torsion beyond their power to contain or control. After all, this could be the case—or register as such—only on condition that the reader is able and willing to apply the most rigorous standards of logical accountability (including the axioms of classical or bivalent true/false reasoning) and thereby locate those moments of aporia or logico-semantic breakdown that signal the limits of any such reckoning” (179).
structures that are thereby subject to a dislocating torsion beyond their power to contain or control. After all, this could be the case—or register as such—only on condition that the reader is able and willing to apply the most rigorous standards of logical accountability (including the axioms of classical or bivalent true/false reasoning) and thereby locate those moments of aporia or logico-semantic breakdown that signal the limits of any such reckoning” (179).
“Such is the requirement even, or
especially, where this leads up to an aporetic juncture or moment of
strictly unresolvable impasse so that the logical necessity arises to
deploy a non-classical, i.e., a deviant, paraconsistent, non-bivalent,
or (in Derrida’s parlance) a 'supplementary' logic.... it is revisionism
only under pressure, that is, as the upshot of a logically meticulous
reading that must be undertaken if deconstruction is not to take refuge
in irrationality or even—as with certain of its US literary variants—in
some specially (often theologically) sanctioned realm of supra-rational
ambiguity or paradox” (185).
And of course this post discussing Morton's book Realist Magic, where he discusses Garfield and Priest's infamous essay "Nagarjuna and the limits of thought"
in refuting the law of the excluded middle,* which the latter used to
support the emptiness of emptiness doctrine. I also did the same in "letting daylight into magic." Morton also references Priest's book on paraconsistent logic, In Contradiction.
* "The ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth" (10).
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