He starts a discussion of kennilingual ontological pluralism on p. 19 (including Hargens), specifically bringing in the kosmic address. He says:
"[It] does not address indeterminacy as deeply as Embodied Realism.... It does not directly address the question of how individuals operating from the same Kosmic Address might differ in their conceptualizations. Also it is not yet apparent whether the concept of Kosmic Address itself is sufficiently determinate" (20).
A couple of points from Murray's "Embodied realisms and integral ontologies" in support of earlier claims in the real/false reason thread. On 44 he is discussing various forms of flawed categorization, one being the "dialectical response" of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. He notes that this can miss unconscious and/or indeterminate aspects of theses like we've recently noticed. Another is illusory recursive structures, like my complaint about the beautiful, self-same fractals of mathematical complexity. He said:
"Naturally occurring fractals have complex organic structure, not the hall-of-mirrors structure of precise nested containers. Natural organic structure can be shown to originate from simpler laws or ten dencies. Illusory recursions seem to be generated by successive workings of the mind's need for order, simplicity, and meaning" (45).