I started the above IPS discussion thread here with a link to the paper here. See the IPS thread for the ongoing discussion. My intial post follows.
Murray is critical of the metaphysical claims and language used by
kennilinguists. And that such claims and language do not take account of
the indeterministic factors he discusses. And he states that "in the
postmetaphysical milieu we can no longer allow for the possibility of
direct contact with 'reality' or 'true knowledge' by some privileged
few" (18).
Yet we must nonetheless allow for the validity of one's feelings and
perceptions of mystical states, which may not be amenable to rational or
scientific analysis. While he argues for postmetaphysical notions of
fallibility of belief on the one hand he seems to want to allow it on
the other, with no way to adjudicate false from valid claims. And that is
the postmetaphysical project, to indeed judge claims to direct
experience to ultimate reality as metaphysical and thereby false. We
need better ways to discern what exactly these mystical experiences are
as yes, fallible best guesses for now open to revision. But they are
better guesses than the metaphysical claims in a progression of
worldview development.
Along that line see the thread on states,
whichs attempt such a postmetaphysical recontexualization that honors
the experiences but not the metaphysical interpretations. Also my thread on states and stages is another such attempt.
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