Also recall this post, From Deconstruction in a Nutshell (Fordham UP, 1997). Note not only the a-dualist (nondual) view but also the notion of indeterminate time in this place, very much akin to Torbert's triple-loop. And how it is a kissing cousin to the withdrawn.
And its likeness to the Buddhist unborn, and the modern terror trope of
the undead. I also like how the Demiurge is responsible, one of the
God/desses invoked by theurj via “a hybrid or bastard reasoning.”*
“When we think of Plato we think of the two worlds or regions allegorized in the cave: the upper world of the intelligible paradigms, the sphere of invisible and unchanging being in the sun of the Good that shines over all, as opposed to the sensible likenesses of the forms in the changing, visible world of becoming.... When presented with a neat distinction or opposition of this sort—and this distinction inaugurates philosophy, carves out the very space of 'meta-physics'—Derrida will not, in the manner of Hegel, look for some uplifting, dialectical reconciliation of the two in a higher third thing, a concrete universal, which contains the 'truth' of the first two. Instead, he will look around—in the text itself—for some third thing that the distinction omits, some untruth, or barely remnant truth, which falls outside the famous distinction, which the truth of either separately or both together fails to capture, which is neither and both of the two.
"In the Timaeus the missing
third thing, a third nature or type—khora—is supplied by Plato himself.
Khora is the immense and indeterminate spatial receptacle in which the
sensible likenesses of the eternal paradigms are 'engendered,' in which
they are 'inscribed' by the Demiurge, thereby providing a 'home' for all
things.... This receptacle is like the forms inasmuch as it has a kind
of eternity: it neither is born or dies, it is always already there, and
hence beyond temporal coming-to-be and passing away; yet it does not
have the eternity of the intelligible paradigms but a certain
a-chronistic a temporality. Because it belongs neither to the
intelligible nor the sensible world Plato says it is 'hardly real.'
Moreover, while it cannot be perceived by the senses but only by the
mind, still it is not an intelligible object of the mind, like the
forms. Hence, Plato says it is not a legitimate son of reason but is
apprehended by a spurious or corrupted logos, a hybrid or bastard
reasoning. Khora in neither intelligible being nor sensible becoming,
but a little like both, the subject matter of neither a true logos nor a
good mythos” (83-4).“When we think of Plato we think of the two worlds or regions allegorized in the cave: the upper world of the intelligible paradigms, the sphere of invisible and unchanging being in the sun of the Good that shines over all, as opposed to the sensible likenesses of the forms in the changing, visible world of becoming.... When presented with a neat distinction or opposition of this sort—and this distinction inaugurates philosophy, carves out the very space of 'meta-physics'—Derrida will not, in the manner of Hegel, look for some uplifting, dialectical reconciliation of the two in a higher third thing, a concrete universal, which contains the 'truth' of the first two. Instead, he will look around—in the text itself—for some third thing that the distinction omits, some untruth, or barely remnant truth, which falls outside the famous distinction, which the truth of either separately or both together fails to capture, which is neither and both of the two.
* This hybrid, bastard reasoning, in my
twisted postmeta parlance, is the ego turned back to its roots in the
body, the centaur that is neither and both, again "in the middle" way of
my mad, madhyamaka kaka.
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