Monday, July 22, 2013

Which body?

The last post reminded me of Habermas' lifeworld background.* But grounded in L&J's embodied cognitive unconscious.** Per Rorher (and Levin and Wilber***) there are different kinds of bodies. Even though Habermas didn't overtly discuss the human physical body his lifeworld background is indeed the cultural (and material) body. Recall that for Mead our mind is embodied both within our physical structure and without our social matrix, the latter being included in the more general environment. All of which are the a priori forgotten, or rather, the a priori we never knew in the first place.

*From this post, Morris on Habermas:


"The lifeworld reveals only a portion of itself in any dialogue because it exists as a phenomenological ‘background’ of pre-theoretical, pre-interpreted contexts of meaning and relevance….the vast proportion of lifeworld convictions always remain in the background during any discussion…. The lifeworld itself cannot be the proper them of communicative utterances, for as a totality it provides the space in or ground upon which such utterances occur, even those that name it explicitly….it remains indeterminate” (235-6).

** "There is much to be said for traditional philosophical reflection and phenomenological analysis. They can makes us aware of many aspects of consciousness and, to a limited extent, can enlarge our capacities for conscious awareness. Phenomenological reflection even allows us to examine many of the background prereflective structures that lie beneath our conscious experience. But neither method can adequately explore the cognitive unconscious—the realm of thought that is completely and irrevocably inaccessible to direct conscious introspection” (12).

*** "Every mind has a body, or every state of consciousness has a corresponding signature state of matter-energy, or every interior prehension has an exterior form" (12).

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