The last post reminded me of Habermas' lifeworld background.* But grounded in L&J's embodied cognitive unconscious.** Per Rorher (and Levin and Wilber***)
there are different kinds of bodies. Even though Habermas didn't
overtly discuss the human physical body his lifeworld background is
indeed the cultural (and material) body. Recall that for Mead
our mind is embodied both within our physical structure and without our
social matrix, the latter being included in the more general
environment. All of which are the a priori forgotten, or rather, the a priori we never knew in the first place.
*From this post, Morris on Habermas:
"The lifeworld reveals only a portion of itself in any dialogue
because it exists as a phenomenological ‘background’ of pre-theoretical,
pre-interpreted contexts of meaning and relevance….the vast proportion
of lifeworld convictions always remain in the background during any
discussion…. The lifeworld itself cannot be the proper them of
communicative utterances, for as a totality it provides the space in or
ground upon which such utterances occur, even those that name it
explicitly….it remains indeterminate” (235-6).
** "There is much to be said for traditional philosophical reflection
and phenomenological analysis. They can makes us aware of many aspects
of consciousness and, to a limited extent, can enlarge our capacities
for conscious awareness. Phenomenological reflection even allows us to
examine many of the background prereflective structures that lie beneath
our conscious experience. But neither method can adequately explore the
cognitive unconscious—the realm of thought that is completely and
irrevocably inaccessible to direct conscious introspection” (12).
*** "Every mind has a body, or every state of consciousness has a
corresponding signature state of matter-energy, or every interior
prehension has an exterior form" (12).
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