More commentary on integral and speculative realist meta-paradigms

Continuing from the last post, a few more comments.

Furthermore, I'm not opposed to big picture meta-theory. It's just that I see the likes of the speculative realists including in theirs this notion of excess, withdrawal or differance at the heart of their meta-paradigm(s). This tends to keep them open and contingent, with much less of the kind of hubris we see in the more 'integral' meta-paradigms that are blind to such excess. It is very much akin to the restricted/general economy and consequent models of restricted/general complexity explored here (and following).* And ironically enough, those SR models seem to me to be more 'integral' than those claiming that title, and more accurately demonstrating the next wave of evolution.


And another thing. It seems the likes of Bryant, as one example, came to the meta-paradigm from intimate study and enactment of the empirical data of individual paradigms. Hence we don't see the kind of over generalizations in the meta-theory first approaches, trying to fit data into its preconceptions. While onticology ends up with a meta-paradigm it does so based on much more solid data. While its meta-paradigm emerges from the ground up holistically, kennilingus and models like the MHC are top-down ideals where the data must fit the meta or it's just not seen. Granted while onticology's meta-paradigm is not yet as comprehensive as kennilingus, I'd suggest it will be much more coherent, accurate and comprehensive when it gets there due to the above.

* Starting with Morin and going from there. It will be most interesting at the ITC in August to see how kennilingus gets along with Morin and Bhaskar, since the latter two challenge the former in ways I've explored ad nauseum in the forum.