This post in the OOO thread references Bryant's ealier book, Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence (NW UP, 2008). Some discussion ensued in continuing posts. Of possible relevance in this thread:
The section "time out of joint" in chapter 7 (starting at 185) sounds similar to DeLanda above, but not quite.
"Rather than approaching time cardinally in terms of succession, we instead seek to determine its ordinal structure...as the immutable form of change conditioning movement.... Put alternatively, conceived transcendentally, the past is that which was never present, the present is that which is only ever present, and the future is that which will never arrive" (186-7).
I'm reminded of Bryant's paper "Time of the object" introduced on p. 7. In the article he discusses this notion of ordinal time as the foundation for the withdrawn (virtual).
In the following Bryant is again bringing in Bergson via Deleuze:
"This does not mean that Deleuze holds that we have an unmediated experience of the infinite and unconditioned.... Deleuze refers to this conception of time as the 'Whole'.... [he] identifies this transformation of the Whole with the openness of all systems....we cannot identify the whole with a totality or closed system.... The Open Whole as the never-given totality of time gives us a priori grounds for critique (D&G, 196-8).
Hmm, a priori grounds for critique? Deleuze's quote and the following text on 198 have time as the a priori and immutable form of change. As such it is not an eternal or timeless essence, but it is a given.
The section "time out of joint" in chapter 7 (starting at 185) sounds similar to DeLanda above, but not quite.
"Rather than approaching time cardinally in terms of succession, we instead seek to determine its ordinal structure...as the immutable form of change conditioning movement.... Put alternatively, conceived transcendentally, the past is that which was never present, the present is that which is only ever present, and the future is that which will never arrive" (186-7).
I'm reminded of Bryant's paper "Time of the object" introduced on p. 7. In the article he discusses this notion of ordinal time as the foundation for the withdrawn (virtual).
In the following Bryant is again bringing in Bergson via Deleuze:
"This does not mean that Deleuze holds that we have an unmediated experience of the infinite and unconditioned.... Deleuze refers to this conception of time as the 'Whole'.... [he] identifies this transformation of the Whole with the openness of all systems....we cannot identify the whole with a totality or closed system.... The Open Whole as the never-given totality of time gives us a priori grounds for critique (D&G, 196-8).
Hmm, a priori grounds for critique? Deleuze's quote and the following text on 198 have time as the a priori and immutable form of change. As such it is not an eternal or timeless essence, but it is a given.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.